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Abstract: This paper analyzes official, high-frequency Bank of Canada intervention and 
exchange rate data (the latter quoted at the end of every 5-minute interval over every 24-
hour period) over the January 1995 to September 1998 time-period. The data is of 
particular interest as it spans over two distinctly different intervention regimes – one 
characterized by purely rules-based (“mechanistic”) intervention versus one characterized 
by both rules-based and discretionary intervention. This unique feature of the data allows 
for both a comparison of the effects of rules-based version discretionary intervention and 
a general investigation of intraday effects of intervention. Employing an event-study 
methodology and three different criteria for success, the study presents strong evidence 
showing that intervention systematically affects movements in the CAD/USD and in the 
desired direction along with some evidence that intervention is associated with a 
reduction of exchange rate volatility. Interestingly, there is no indication that 
discretionary intervention is more effective than rules-based intervention. 
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1. Introduction 
The growing literature on foreign exchange rate market microstructure has made 
important contributions towards a better understanding of how exchange rate markets 
process and react to new information.1 Furthermore, market microstructure models 
incorporating central bank intervention have advanced our understanding of how central 
bank intervention may affect exchange rates.2 A common feature of the existing 
intervention literature, however, is the implicit assumption of a single underlying 
intervention strategy and a constant intervention regime.3
 This paper adds to the empirical intervention literature by investigating whether 
rules or discretion matter for the effectiveness of intervention. The presented analysis 
employs official, high-frequency (intraday) data on Bank of Canada (BoC) intervention 
in the CAD/USD exchange rate market over the 1 January 1995 to 30 September 1998 
time-period. This time-period spans over two distinctly different BoC intervention 
regimes. The data-set contains unique information on whether intervention operations 
were discretionary or carried out in accordance with a rules-based (“mechanistic”) policy 
framework. This feature of the data at hand facilitates both a comparison of the effects of 
rules-based versus discretionary intervention and a general investigation of intraday 
effects of intervention. 
 During the first regime, which ended on 11 April 1995, BoC intervention 
operations were very frequent as well as purely mechanistic. A CAD/USD exchange rate 
movement of a certain size would trigger intervention and, furthermore, appreciations and 
depreciations would generate the same response in absolute terms. On 12 April 1995, a 
new intervention program with both a mechanistic and a discretionary component was 
 
1 See Evans and Lyons (2002) and Lyons (2001) for important contributions. 
2 See, for example, Dominguez (2003a), Evans and Lyons (2001) and Pasquariello (2001). 
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introduced, thus allowing for more flexibility with respect to timing as well as with 
respect to magnitude of interventions.4 Accordingly, the data set allows for a distinction 
between interventions carried out under the pre- versus the post-April 1995 regime and, 
more importantly, between mechanistic and discretionary intervention operations.  
 The BoC is one of very few central banks to make the records of the intraday 
timing of its intervention operations available for the purpose of external research.5 
However, the BoC data is not publicly available and so far only two internal studies 
(available as BoC working papers and discussed below) have investigated the high-
frequency BoC intervention data. Both of these existing BoC high-frequency intervention 
studies focus exclusively on immediate volatility effects, and do so within a time-series 
analysis context. Consistent with Fatum and Hutchison (2006), and unlike the two 
existing studies of the BoC high-frequency intervention data, this paper investigates 
direction, smoothing, as well as volatility effects of BoC intervention over varying 
intraday window-lengths surrounding the intervention events and it does not employ a 
time-series framework for doing so. 
 Beattie and Fillion (1999) provide a time-series analysis of the intraday effects of 
intervention on the implied volatility of CAD/USD exchange rate options over the 12 
April 1995 to 30 January 1998 period. They find that mechanistic intervention was 
widely anticipated by the market and had no impact on volatility, and some evidence that 
discretionary intervention was unanticipated and associated with a short-term decrease in 
3 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Edison (1993), Humpage (2003), King (2003), and Sarno 
and Taylor (2001) for surveys of the intervention literature. 
4 In September 1998, the BoC abandoned the mechanistic component and retained only the 
discretionary part. The BoC has not intervened in the CAD/USD market since 17 September 
1998, which is also the last intervention day in the sample studied in this paper. 
5 As noted by Dominguez (2003b), central banks rarely provide the exact timing of interventions 
or disclose how many intervention operations occurred over the course of a day. The BoC and the 
Swiss National Bank are exceptions. 
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volatility.6 In the second study using the high-frequency BoC intervention data, D’Souza 
(2002) incorporates both intervention data and data on BoC transactions aimed at 
replenishing reserves in order to test market microstructure hypotheses. He finds that 
foreign exchange traders treat an intervention operation as any other customer order and 
suggests that, in order to be effective, central banks must be able to forecast overall net 
customer trades at the time of intervention. 
 Two recent studies of official, high-frequency Swiss National Bank intervention 
data are of particular relevance to this study, both in terms of findings and methodology. 
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) focus on (scaled) exchange rate changes measured between 
consecutive interventions and use an irregular time-series model as the foundation for 
their analysis. They find that only initial interventions matter while subsequent 
interventions are ineffective. In a recent contribution, Payne and Vitale (2003) extend the 
analysis conducted by Fischer and Zurlinden (1999). Within the context of an event study 
approach, they find evidence of a systematic link between intervention and both 
exchange rate returns and volatility. In particular, they show that intervention operations 
have short-run effects on the CHF/USD exchange rate lasting from 15 minutes to up to 
two hours following intervention. Payne and Vitale (2003) also find that intervention has 
a stronger impact when the Swiss National Bank moves with-the-market (“leaning with 
the wind”) and when its intervention is concerted with other central banks. 
 This study follows recent papers by Fatum (2000), Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 
2006), Morel and Teiletche (2004), Payne and Vitale (2003) and others in employing an 
 
6 These findings are consistent with Murray, Zelmer and McManus (1996), who analyze volatility 
effects of official daily BoC intervention data over a time-period covering both intervention 
regimes. For other daily data studies of BoC intervention see also Phillips and Pippenger (1993) 
and Rogers and Siklos (2003). These two external studies do not employ official BoC intervention 
data. 
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event study methodology for analyzing the effects of intervention on exchange rates.7 In 
this context of analyzing exchange rate movements around high-frequency intervention 
events, spot exchange rates quoted at the end of every 5-minute interval over a 24-hour 
period are investigated. Specifically, 5 through 120 minute windows around clusters of 
intraday intervention transactions are examined and, consistent with Fatum and 
Hutchison (2006), the effectiveness of intervention is assessed according to three 
different criteria for what may constitute effectiveness. 
In addition, the paper takes into account the issue of currency co-movements. 
Currency co-movements are of potential importance to a study of this kind when the 
focus is on unilateral intervention conducted by a relatively small central bank and aimed 
at managing a minor currency vis-à-vis a major currency.8 In order to address the 
currency co-movement concern, the analysis of effectiveness is carried out on a “filtered” 
CAD/USD exchange rate as well as on the readily observable or “raw” CAD/USD rate. 
The “filtered” exchange rate measure is calculated as the difference between the 
percentage change in the (“raw”) CAD/USD rate and a weighted average of the 
percentage change in the GBP/USD, DEM/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates. 
Dominguez (2003b) notes that, in contrast to studies of long-term effects of 
intervention, empirical studies of intraday effects of intervention generally find evidence 
that intervention matters. Consistent with her assessment, this study finds strong evidence 
in support of effectiveness when analyzing exchange rate returns (i.e. when focusing on 
the “direction” and the “smoothing” criteria of success) over the 5- through 120-minute 
windows. Additionally, the study finds some evidence that intervention is associated with 
 
7 An event study is a very general test of a specific hypothesis and does not rely on a structural 
model of exchange rate determination. This is a desirable feature given the lack of consensus over 
the appropriate structural exchange rate model, but the drawback is that the particular channel of 
transmission (if intervention is effective) is not identified.  
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a reduction of exchange rate volatility, although it appears that the volatility effects are 
short-lived (only detectable within an hour after the intervention event) and not robust to 
adjusting for currency co-movements. 
Contrasting the results of the analysis of rules-based events with the results of the 
analysis of the discretionary events does not suggest that discretionary intervention is 
more effective than rules-based intervention. In fact, the CAD/USD exchange rate market 
appears to react the same way to frequent and anticipated interventions as it does to 
infrequent and unanticipated intervention. This is an interesting and unexpected finding. 
Although the event study methodology does not identify a specific channel through 
which intervention works, if effective, this result seems to indicate that intervention has a 
price impact through the (micro) portfolio-balance channel rather than through signaling. 
As such, the finding that rules-based intervention appears no less effective than 
discretionary intervention appears in line with the order-flow analysis presented in Evans 
and Lyons (2001).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of institutional aspects of BoC intervention pertaining to the period under 
study. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 discusses the event study methodology and 
the criteria for assessing effectiveness. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional Aspects 
The BoC intervenes in the CAD in its capacity of fiscal agent for the Government of 
Canada. In order to do so, the BoC uses the Government’s foreign exchange reserves, 
held in the Exchange Fund Account. In accordance with the Canadian Currency Act, 
8 Canada is a small, open economy with spot turnover in its currency representing about 2% of 
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foreign exchange reserves may be used to protect the external value of the monetary unit 
of Canada. With respect to foreign exchange intervention, this mandate has been 
interpreted to mean maintaining an orderly market for the CAD, i.e. BoC intervention is 
aimed at smoothing (intraday) movements of the exchange rate and providing liquidity to 
the foreign exchange market when needed.  
BoC intervention in the CAD/USD exchange rate market is unilateral (in 
particular, the US Fed is not intervening in the CAD/USD market) and characterized as 
“leaning against the wind” in the sense that CAD are bought (sold) when the CAD 
depreciates (appreciates) against the USD. All BoC intervention operations are sterilized 
on a daily basis. 
During the 1995 to 1998 period, intervention in the CAD/USD exchange rate 
typically took place during North American market hours from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 
EST, with some instances of intervention continuing overnight during European market 
hours.9 Intervention was passive, with the BoC leaving offers to buy and sell CAD rather 
than hitting bids. 
 The period under study features two distinct intervention regimes. A rules-based 
regime characterized by a mechanical – and therefore predictable – response to exchange 
rate movements was in place until 12 April 1995. During this regime, the BoC 
determined when to intervene by monitoring a 100-basis point “non-intervention” band. 
When the exchange rate breached one end of this band, intervention operations (in terms 
of USD purchases or sales against CAD) were conducted at pre-set levels of intensity, 
with intensity measured by the amount of intervention that occurred for each basis point 
change in the CAD/USD. The standard amount was CAD 4 million per basis point. The 
total daily average foreign exchange turnover during the time-period under study (BIS 1999).  
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non-intervention band was dragged or “ratcheted” in the direction that intervention 
occurred according to the amount and intensity of the most recent intervention operation. 
Under this mechanistic framework, intervention was persistent and would continue until 
the CAD/USD reversed direction and moved back inside the non-intervention band. As a 
result, the BoC intervened on average on almost every other business day during this 
regime. Intervention during this period was typically conducted directly with dealers at 
the major chartered banks who were instructed to keep the intervention activity secret. 
 On 12 April 1995, a revised intervention regime was introduced. It was designed 
to increase the effect of intervention by reducing its frequency, increasing its magnitude, 
allowing for more discretion with respect to its timing, and raising the visibility when it 
occurred. The change in intervention policy followed a major review of the purely 
mechanistic intervention regime and reflected the growth of the currency markets as well 
as the state of the academic literature on intervention.10
Under the revised regime, the non-intervention band was widened to 140 basis 
points and was rebased daily around the 4:00 p.m. EST North American closing 
exchange rate. The daily rebasing reduced the frequency of intervention to less than 10% 
of business days by 1996, as the currency would have to move by 70 basis points in 
either direction following rebasing before new intervention would occur. The visibility of 
intervention was increased by increasing the standard intensity of intervention to CAD 8 
                                        
9 If the currency continued to move in one direction at the end of the North American trading 
hours, the BoC would leave instructions with a European agent, typically the Bank of England, in 
order for the agent to carry out intervention on behalf of the BoC. 
10 The BoC addressed the change in a letter sent to foreign exchange market participants on 5 
April 1995: “…[The] conclusions of this work support the idea that foreign exchange market 
intervention is most useful when used as a signaling tool. Our analysis of the current intervention 
techniques we use is that they are not as effective as they could be in this regard. This is largely 
because the frequency of our intervention tends to reduce the “newsworthiness” of the fact that we 
are in the market. Also, given the volumes in today’s market, the intensity of our current 
intervention probably adds little in terms of enhancing market liquidity.” (Letter from Don 
Stephenson, Associate Adviser, Bank of Canada.) 
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million per basis point. Furthermore, intervention was primarily conducted through 
foreign exchange brokers, who were instructed to announce BoC intervention as soon as 
the first transaction of the day had been completed.  
Finally, the revised framework introduced greater discretion, although 
mechanistic elements were maintained. The wider non-intervention band continued to be 
dragged up or down intraday in response to each intervention operation. However, the 
timing of intervention could be varied to allow the BoC to intervene earlier and with 
greater intensity in response to what were believed to be destabilizing movements of the 
exchange rate. During such turbulent periods, the non-intervention band could be reset at 
half the distance from its normal setting, allowing the BoC to intervene sooner, and the 
intensity of intervention could be increased as the situation demanded. A decision to reset 
the band in this fashion was initiated by the BoC and authorized by the Department of 
Finance. 
  See Chiu (2003), D’Souza (2002), and Murray, Zelmer, and McManus (1996) for 
additional details on the BoC intervention framework during the 1995 to 1998 period. 
See also Neely (2001) for an interesting paper on intervention practices based on survey 
responses from 22 monetary authorities, including the Bank of Canada. 
 
3. Data 
This study uses non-public, high-frequency (intraday) intervention data, provided by the 
BoC. The data set contains information on each individual intervention transaction, 
including the date, the time and the transaction size.11
During the full sample period, 2 January 1995 to 30 September 1998, the BoC 
carried out 1530 intervention transactions (on a total of 151 intervention days). Of these 
 10
                                                                   
transactions, 371 (on a total of 40 intervention days) took place during the intervention 
program that ended on 11 April 1995. 12  
The individual intervention transactions ranged in magnitude from USD 2 
million to USD 138 million, with an average amount of USD 18 million and a median 
amount of USD 20 million.13 On intervention days, an average of 21 transactions 
occurred, with the number of transactions ranging from a low of one to a high of 83 (on 7 
August 1998). The amount traded on intervention days ranged from USD 5 million to 
USD 1.2 billion, with a mean of USD 380 million and a median of USD 300 million 
Table 1 provides an overview of the high-frequency intervention data-set. It 
shows that a total of 694 intervention transactions were discretionary while the remaining 
836 transactions were carried out in accordance with the mechanistic policy framework. 
Table 1 also shows that the number of interventions that occurred due to a mechanical 
rebasing of the non-intervention band dominated in 1995, while the number of 
discretionary interventions increased steadily from 1996 and onwards. Additionally, the 
table shows that the number of purchases and sales were largely balanced in 1995, while 
the ratio of purchases to sales increased dramatically over the following years. 
The analysis relies on high-frequency exchange rate data purchased from Olsen 
and Associates. This data provides the spot exchange rate at the end of every 5-minute 
interval over a 24-hour period for the CAD/USD, DEM/USD, GBP/USD and JPY/USD 
11 Since the intervention data set is not publicly available, the paper is not displaying or describing 
the intervention magnitudes in great detail. 
12 The starting date of the sample is determined by data availability, as the BoC has not maintained 
records of intraday intervention transactions prior to January 1995. 
13 Individual transaction magnitude may contain limited information as intervention transactions 
conducted through foreign exchange brokers were often bundled together to reduce the number of 
individual trade “tickets”. The event study methodology employed in this study does not rely on 
information regarding transaction size and uses bid/ask rates rather than transaction prices in order 
to facilitate the investigation of exchange rate movements across different window lengths. 
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exchange rates.14 The evolution of the intervention variable against the CAD/USD 
exchange rate is displayed in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the CAD/USD juxtaposed against 
an equally-weighted basket of the DEM, the GBP and the JPY vis-à-vis the USD, with all 
exchange rates indexed to 100 at the beginning of the sample period. 
 
4. Methodology 
The starting point for an event study is to define the event of interest and to identify the 
periods over which the security price is examined (the “event windows”). In this context, 
the event is defined as a cluster of intervention transactions and the event windows are 
the pre- and post-event minutes during which the CAD/USD exchange rate movements 
are analyzed. 
Specifically, an event is defined as a cluster of individual intervention operations 
in the CAD/USD exchange rate market in one direction (in terms of purchases or sales), 
interspaced by at most 30 minutes of no intervention operations (the “tranquility” period 
that can be allowed for while still considering the surrounding intervention transactions 
to be part of one and the same event). Given the frequency and structure of the 
intervention data at hand, we adjust the methodology of Fatum (2000) and Fatum and 
Hutchison (2003, 2006) to accommodate the analysis of intervention data captured at this 
higher frequency, and employ a “tranquillity” period of 30 minutes for our baseline 
results (and vary this number in the robustness checks). Consistent with the high-
 
14 The bid and offer rates are provided for intervals where an actual trade takes place, while a 
representative quote is used for other periods. There is little time-variation in the bid-ask spreads 
and the analysis focuses on the bid rates. 
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frequency analysis presented in Payne and Vitale (2003), pre- and post-event window 
lengths of 5 through 120 minutes are applied.15
 As noted by, for example, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) there is no convention 
on what constitutes successful intervention. This analysis follows Fatum and Hutchison 
(2006) and applies their three alternative criteria of success. The first criterion of success 
is simply whether the direction of the movement in the exchange rate is the same as the 
direction in which the BoC was intervening, e.g. does the value of the CAD relative to 
the USD increase after CAD are purchased? This measure of successfulness is referred to 
as the “direction” criterion and is formally expressed as follows: An event is a success if 
either  
 
{Ei > 0 and ∆si+ > 0} or {Ei < 0 and ∆si+ < 0} 
 
where Ei is the total amount of central bank intervention (positive values represent 
purchases of USD, negative values represent sales of USD) during event i and ∆si+ is the 
CAD/USD exchange rate change (in percent) during the associated post-event window. 
 As previously noted, the stated motivation for BoC intervention is to maintain 
orderly markets, suggesting that intervention operations are carried out for the purpose of 
smoothing exchange rate movements or reducing exchange rate volatility, rather than for 
affecting the direction of exchange rate movements. The next two effectiveness criteria 
assess whether the BoC succeeded in accordance with the stated purpose of intent. 
 The second criterion defines a successful event as one where intervention is 
associated with a smoothing of the exchange rate movement. This criterion is formally 
 
15 Additionally, the window lengths are not expanded beyond 120 minutes in order to eliminate 
instances of pre- and post-event window overlaps. 
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expressed as follows: An event is a success according to the “smoothing” criterion if 
either  
 
{the event is a success according to the “direction” criterion} or 
{Ei > 0 and ∆si+ > ∆si-} or {Ei < 0 and ∆si+ < ∆si-} 
 
where ∆si- is the CAD/USD exchange rate change (in percent) during the associated pre-
event window. 
 The third criterion of success compares the (realized) variance of the CAD/USD 
exchange rate preceding and succeeding each event, respectively, and associates reduced 
volatility after relative to before the event with success. This criterion is formally 
expressed as follows: An event is a success according to the “volatility” criterion if  
  
 {σ2i+ < σ2i-} 
 
where σ2i+ (σ2i-) denotes the realized post-event variance (pre-event variance) of the 
CAD/USD exchange rate. More specifically, the high-frequency exchange rate data is 
used for calculating  the variance of the CAD/USD exchange rate during the 30, 60, 90 
and 120 minutes preceding and succeeding each event in order to facilitate the 
comparison of volatility patterns around each of the events. 
 Three statistical tests are employed. The main test is the non-parametric sign 
test for the median. This test verifies whether the observed number of successes based on 
the “direction” (appreciation or depreciation), the “smoothing” (appreciation/smaller 
depreciation or depreciation/smaller appreciation), and the “volatility” (decreased or not) 
criteria are random or systematic. 
 14
                    
 With reference to the “direction” criterion for success, the null-hypothesis is that 
the probability of observing a positive value (“success”) is the same as that of observing a 
negative value (“no-success”), hence the underlying probability parameter is 0.5. In other 
words, the random variable X (equal to the number of positive values or “successes”) 
among n sample observations has a binomial distribution with µ = 0.5. A significant sign 
test indicates that the observed number of successes is not a random finding attributable 
to the equal probability of appreciation or depreciation. For details on this test in event 
studies, see MacKinlay (1997).16
It should be noted that the BoC interventions are always leaning against the wind 
(e.g. the BoC purchases CAD in response to a CAD depreciation), thus the “true” 
probability of observing a reversal of the exchange rate movement around periods of 
intervention (under the assumption that intervention has no effect) is likely to be less than 
0.5. Therefore, a probability parameter choice of 0.50 (0.75) when assessing effectiveness 
according to the “direction” (“smoothing”) criterion constitutes a conservative parameter 
value that tends to bias the results towards not finding significant effects of intervention. 
Put differently, it literally raises the bar with respect to the number of successes necessary 
for rejecting randomness.17  
In addition, the non-parametric rank test and the matched sample (difference-in-
means) tests are employed. The matched sample test is only associated with the 
“smoothing” criterion as it indicates, at the minimum, smaller post-event CAD 
 
16 See Fatum (2000) for a discussion of the choice of probability parameters associated with the 
“direction” and the “smoothing” criteria for success and Fatum and Hutchison (2006) regarding 
the “volatility” criterion. 
17 This is indeed confirmed when calculating the probability of observing a change in the direction 
of the CAD/USD exchange rate and the probability of observing a smoothing over the sub-sample 
of observations that were not part of any of the events as a control sample, as suggested by Fatum 
(2000). For example, when focusing on the 10-minute window length, the “unconditional” 
probability of observing a “direction” (“smoothing”) success over the full 1995 – 1998 time-
period is 0.483 (0.693). 
 15
                    
depreciation or appreciation. Since both additional tests confirm the results based on the 
sign test, only sign test results are reported.18
 
4.1 Currency Co-Movements 
Eun and Lai (2004) point out that despite the vast research in co-movement of other asset 
prices such as bonds and stocks, the issue of currency co-movement has not been given 
much attention in the academic literature. They document systematic co-movement 
patterns across several currencies, in particular vis-à-vis the USD and to a lesser extent 
vis-à-vis the EUR, and they present evidence that currency co-movement is significantly 
driven by “the competitive influence” of major currencies on minor ones.  
Currency co-movements are also of potential importance to the analysis of 
effectiveness of intervention, in particular when focusing on unilateral intervention 
conducted by a minor central bank and aimed at managing a minor currency vis-à-vis a 
major currency. To illustrate this point, suppose an appreciation of the CAD against the 
USD follows a BoC intervention event characterized by CAD purchases. The event will 
then appear effective according to the “direction” criterion described above. However, if 
the USD is depreciating against not just the CAD but against other currencies in general, 
there is little reason to believe that the USD depreciation should be ascribed to the 
unilateral BoC intervention transactions.  
In order to make an attempt at addressing this concern, the analysis of 
effectiveness is carried out on a “filtered” CAD/USD exchange rate as well as on the 
readily observable or “raw” CAD/USD rate. The “filtered” exchange rate measure is 
calculated as the difference between the percentage change in the (“raw”) CAD/USD rate 
 
18 For details on the rank test in event studies, see Cambell and Wasley (1993) and MacKinley 
(1997). See, for example, Ben-Horim and Levy (1984, p. 458) for details on the matched sample 
test and Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 2006) for applications. 
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and a weighted average of the percentage change in the GBP/USD, DEM/USD and 
JPY/USD exchange rates.19
 
4.2 Intraday Seasonal Volatility Patterns 
It is known that high-frequency exchange rate data display intraday seasonal volatility 
patterns (see, for example, Andersen and Bollerslev 1998 and Andersen, Bollerslev and 
Das 2001). Therefore, assessing the impact of intervention in accordance with the 
“volatility” criterion could lead to false conclusions unless intraday seasonality in the 
CAD/USD is accounted for. In order to address this concern, the analysis follows Beattie 
and Fillion (1999) and captures the intraday patterns using a Flexible Fourier Form (FFF) 
with a seasonality parameter of 3 (thus allowing for three seasonality cycles within each 
24-hour period). In fact, the exact same FFF as described in detail by Beattie and Fillion 
(1999, p. 8-9) is used, except that the FFF estimations of this paper employ 5-minute 
rather than 10-minute exchange rate quotes and, therefore, doubles the number of 
intervals per day. 
 A second estimation of intraday volatility patterns includes to the FFF a dummy 
variable that controls for time-intervals coinciding with intervention transactions. This 
dummy variable is included to address the possibility that intraday exchange rate 
volatility is abnormally high when intervention occurs.20 In the context of a time-series 
analysis of the impact of intervention on volatility, inclusion of the intervention dummy 
in the FFF estimations would be very problematic not only because of (additional) 
potential simultaneity bias but because the intervention variable itself is subsequently 
 
19 As a robustness check, different weights are used for calculating the “filtered” exchange rate. 
The findings, however, show only little variation across the range of weight combinations and, 
therefore, only the results based on equal weights are reported. 
20 Fischer (2003) finds that intraday exchange rate volatility is almost three times higher on 
intervention days. 
 17
used as an explanatory variable when modeling the seasonally adjusted volatility. 
However, this is not a concern in this event study analysis where the focus is on exchange 
rate behavior before and after the intervention events, i.e. when no intervention occurs. 
 As it turns out, whether effectiveness of intervention is assessed according to the 
“volatility” criterion using the CAD/USD exchange rate without adjusting for seasonality 
of intraday volatility patterns or using either of the two adjustments described above, 
identical conclusions are reached. The volatility results discussed in detail in the next 
section are based on the exchange rate series that have not been adjusted for seasonality. 
 
5 The Results of the High-Frequency Event Study 
Using the baseline event definition that allows for a maximum of 30 minutes of no-
intervention while still considering the surrounding intervention transactions to be part of 
one and the same event, 321 separate BoC intervention events are identified, 270 of 
which occurred within market hours (EST). While the timing of the intervention 
transactions carried out within market hours is recorded by the BoC (and provided with 
the intervention data), this is not the case for the transactions that took place outside of 
North American market hours. Therefore, in order to fully utilize the knowledge of the 
timing of intervention transactions and, subsequently, the timing of the events, the 
analysis focuses on the 270 events that took place within market hours.  
By construction of the event definition itself, each event is characterized as either 
a CAD purchase or a CAD sale event and, furthermore, each event is well-defined with 
respect to the timing of start and finish. Therefore, for each event it is straightforward to 
calculate the associated pre- and post-event exchange rate changes and volatilities 
separately for each of the 24 different window lengths (5 through 120 minutes). This, in 
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turn, enables the analysis to classify each event as successful or not according to each of 
the three criteria for success, separately across each of the 24 windows lengths. 
 
5.1 Direction Results 
Figure 3 displays the results from the sign test based on the “direction” criterion with the 
underlying probability parameter of 0.50 across all window lengths (5 through 120 
minutes). 21 For all figures 3.1 through 3.6, the horizontal line shows the number of 
successes necessary for rejecting randomness at the 95 percent significance level. Figure 
3.1 summarizes the findings based on all 270 events and the “raw” CAD/USD exchange 
rate while figure 3.2 summarizes the findings based on the same 270 events and the 
“filtered” CAD/USD rate. 
All the bars in figure 3.1 reach or exceed the horizontal line (at 150 successes out 
of 270), thus the null hypothesis that the observed number of successes is random is 
rejected (separately) for each window length. Put differently, the results displayed in 
figure 3.1 provide strong evidence that BoC intervention is associated in a highly 
significant and systematic way with intraday movements in the CAD/USD exchange rate.  
Turning to the analysis of the “filtered” exchange rate and figure 3.2, the findings 
of significance at the 95 percent level are repeated for window lengths of one hour or less 
while the longer window lengths are, at a minimum, associated with significance at the 
90 percent level. For both figures 3.1 and 3.2 is it the case that the significance levels 
tend to drop as the window length increases.  
As noted earlier, the sample period under study is of particular interest as it 
comprises two different intervention regimes, the first characterized by mechanistic 
intervention and the second characterized by both mechanistic and discretionary 
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intervention. In order to investigate whether mechanistic and discretionary intervention 
events affect the market differently, the analysis is re-done separately on the sub-sample 
of events associated with mechanistic intervention and separately on the sub-sample of 
events associated with discretionary intervention.22
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the results of the analysis of the 145 mechanistic events 
using the “raw” CAD/USD and the “filtered” CAD/USD exchange rate, respectively. 
Both figures repeat the patterns displayed for the full samples, i.e. when focusing on the 
“raw” exchange rate, intervention is significant at the 95 percent level across all window 
lengths while intervention is significant, at a minimum, at the 90 percent level when 
looking at the “filtered” exchange rate. 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the results based on the discretionary events. Again, for 
almost all window lengths of one hour or less is it the case that the null hypothesis of 
randomness is rejected at the 95 percent significance level (at 73 successes or more out of 
125). Somewhat surprisingly, there is no indication that discretionary intervention is, on 
average, associated with stronger effects than mechanistic intervention. In fact, when 
focusing on the window lengths that are longer than one hour there is not a single 
instance of significant effects of discretionary intervention at the 95 percent level and this 
is in contrast to the findings based on the sub-sample of only mechanistic events.23 The 
previously observed pattern of lowered significance levels as the window lengths are 
expanded is repeated.  
21 Due to the non-public nature of the BoC intervention data, the intervention volumes and the 
exact timing of events are not displayed. 
22 Events containing both mechanistic and discretionary intervention transactions are classified as 
discretionary. Alternatively, dropping these “mixed” events from the analysis does not affect the 
results. 
23 It is noteworthy that the difference in sample sizes when comparing significance across 
mechanistic and discretionary events leads to different degrees of freedom of the sign test and, 
furthermore, that the success-to-failure ratio is very similar across the two sub-samples. 
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In sum, the analysis based on the “direction” criterion of success shows that BoC 
intervention is significantly associated with intraday movements in the CAD/USD 
exchange rate and that the effects of intervention appear to be the strongest when 
window-lengths of one hour or less are considered. Furthermore, the results imply that 
BoC intervention has a very similar intraday impact on the CAD/USD exchange rate 
regardless of whether the intervention events are rules-based or discretionary. 
 
5.2 Smoothing Results 
Figure 4 displays the results based on the “smoothing” criterion and the sign test with the 
underlying probability parameter of 0.75 across all window lengths. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
summarize the findings based on all 270 events and the “raw” CAD/USD and the 
“filtered CAD/USD exchange rate, respectively. The observed number of successes is, of 
course, higher than the observed number of successes according to the “direction” 
criterion, by construction of the “smoothing” criterion that embodies the “direction” 
criterion; similarly, so is the number of successes necessary in order to reject the null 
hypothesis of randomness. Both figure 4.1 and 4.2 show patterns very similar to the 
corresponding “direction” figures (figures 3.1 and 3.2) and repeat the findings of 
significance at the 95 percent level for all window lengths when focusing on the “raw” 
exchange rate measure while the longer window lengths for both the “raw” and the 
“filtered” rate are associated with significance at the 90. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 (figures 4.5 and 4.6) display the results based on the 145 
(125) mechanistic (discretionary) events and the findings are very similar to those based 
on the “direction” criterion. In particular, there is once again no indication whatsoever 
that discretionary intervention is more effective than mechanistic intervention. 
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Furthermore, figure 4.6 shows that there are no significant effects of discretionary 
intervention at the 95 percent level when focusing on the “filtered” exchange rate. 
 
5.3 Volatility Results 
Figure 5 displays the results from the comparison of pre-event versus post-event volatility 
across window lengths of 30, 60, 90, and 120 minutes. In this context, the sign test 
determines whether the observed number of events associated with decreased CAD/USD 
volatility is random or systematically associated with intervention events. Consistent with 
the volatility analysis in Fatum and Hutchison (2006), the test has an underlying 
probability parameter of 0.50 thus the horizontal 95 percent significance lines for all 
figures 5.1 through 5.6 are (pair wise) identical to the significance lines for the sign test 
results of the “direction” criterion, as displayed in figures 3.1 through 3.6. 
 Focusing first on the analysis using the “raw” exchange rate, figures 5.1, 5.3 and 
5.5 all show that the number of events associated with decreased post-event volatility is 
high enough to reject randomness at conventional significance levels when 30 and 60 
minutes window-lengths are investigated while the number of successes according to the 
“volatility” criterion is too small to question randomness when the window-lengths are 
expanded. In other words, the volatility effects of intervention are significant but short-
lived in the sense that the effects are only detectable when comparing exchange rate 
movements within one hour before and after the events. This appears to be the case 
regardless of whether the sub-samples of mechanistic and discretionary intervention are 
analyzed separately or whether all the events are analyzed jointly. 
 Turning to the “filtered” exchange rate and the results displayed in figures 5.2, 
5.4 and 5.6, the pattern regarding lower significance levels as the window-lengths are 
expanded is repeated. For the analysis using the “filtered” exchange rate, however, none 
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of the window lengths are associated in a highly significant and systematic way with 
intraday CAD/USD exchange rate volatility (none of the bars reach the horizontal 95 
percent significance line), implying that the effects of intervention on volatility patterns 
within the first two hours around the described events are less robust than the effects of 
intervention on “discretion” and “smoothing”.24
 
5.4 Monetary Policy Changes and USD Intervention by Other Central Banks 
As mentioned by Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and others, the event study methodology 
assumes that intervention defines the event and is not systematically related to other 
relevant economic news such as monetary policy changes or USD intervention by other 
central banks. 
 In order to address this concern, the analysis of sections 5.1 through 5.3 is also 
carried out on sub-samples of events that do not occur on days coinciding with a 
monetary policy change in either Canada or the United States. Table 2 shows that there 
are only 13 days over the full sample where BoC intervention coincided with a BoC 
change of the target for the overnight interest rate. There are no cases of BoC intervention 
coinciding with changes in US monetary policy. The results described above are robust to 
the exclusion of the high-frequency events occurring on days when the BoC changed 
monetary policy. 
Intervention in the DEM/USD or the JPY/USD exchange rate markets by other 
major central banks coincides with 4 days of BoC intervention. Dropping the associated 
high-frequency events from the analysis does not impact the results. 
 
24 Some studies find that intervention is systematically associated with increased volatility (see 
Galati, Melick and Micu, 2005, for a recent discussion) and, therefore, the analysis also tests for 
this possibility. However, the observed number of events associated with increased volatility is 
random across all window lengths (30, 60, 90 and 120 minutes). 
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As a methodological robustness check, the baseline event definition is changed 
and the analysis of sections 5.1 through 5.3 redone. Specifically, an event is redefined as 
a cluster of individual intervention operations in one direction, interspaced by at most 60 
(instead of 30) minutes of no intervention operations. Using this altered event definition, 
220 (instead of 270) within market hours events are identified. The analysis of these 220 
events, including separate analyses of mechanistic and discretionary events, reaches 
identical conclusions as the analysis based on the 270 baseline events. 
 
6  Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of sterilized intervention in the CAD/USD 
exchange rate from 1995 to 1998, using official intervention data provided by the BoC. 
The time period under study covers two different intervention regimes – an earlier 
mechanistic regime where intervention was frequent and widely anticipated, and a 
revised regime that introduced discretion on the timing and intensity f intervention. The 
data set consists of high-frequency (intraday) data with information on the timing of each 
intervention transaction and, importantly, the data contains unique information on 
whether intervention operations were discretionary or carried out in accordance with the 
rules-based (“mechanistic”) policy framework. 
 The analysis uses an event study framework and different criteria of success for 
investigating the effects of intervention on exchange rates, and controls for currency co-
movements by carrying out the analysis on a readily observable or “raw” CAD/USD 
exchange rate as well as on a “filtered” CAD/USD exchange rate. 
Consistent with the general assessment of Dominguez (2003b) regarding 
empirical studies of intraday effects of intervention and consistent with the results of 
Payne and Vitale (2003), this study provides strong evidence in support of effectiveness 
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when analyzing exchange rate returns (i.e. when focusing on the “direction” and the 
“smoothing” criteria of success) over the 5- through 120-minute windows. Additionally, 
the study finds evidence that intervention is associated with a relatively short-lived 
reduction of exchange rate volatility. 
Contrasting the results of the analysis of rules-based events with the results of the 
analysis of the discretionary events does not suggest that discretionary intervention is 
more effective than rules-based intervention. Although the event study methodology does 
not identify a specific channel through which intervention works, if effective, this result 
seems to indicate that intervention is not working through the signaling channel. Instead, 
this finding seems consistent with the order-flow analysis presented in Evans and Lyons 
(2001), in which it is shown that sterilized intervention that is unannounced and not 
associated with a monetary policy signal has significant portfolio-balance price effects. 
 It is important to note that the presented analysis concerns short-term effects of 
intervention and, therefore, the conclusions do not pertain to long-term effects. In a 
general modeling framework, Dominguez (2003b) illustrates this point nicely. She 
expands the model by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) to include interventions and 
shows that only those interventions that provide information about future fundamentals 
should be expected to have long-term effects while interventions providing only “non-
fundamentals” information may potentially exacerbate non-fundamentals driven 
exchange rate movements in the short run. In other words, her analysis illustrates and 
offers an explanation for why the short-run effects of intervention may differ from its 
long-run effects. In keeping with this point, additional work is needed in order to address 
the issue of long-run effects and associated policy implications of BoC intervention. 
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Figure 1: Intervention in the CAD and the CAD/USD rate 
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Figure 2: Index of CAD versus Net Change in Basket of DEM,  
JPY and GBP (1 January 1995 = 100) 
 
90.00
95.00
100.00
105.00
110.00
115.00
3-
Ja
n-
95
14
-F
eb
-9
5
28
-M
ar
-9
5
10
-M
ay
-9
5
22
-J
un
-9
5
4-
A
ug
-9
5
19
-S
ep
-9
5
1-
N
ov
-9
5
14
-D
ec
-9
5
30
-J
an
-9
6
12
-M
ar
-9
6
24
-A
pr
-9
6
6-
Ju
n-
96
19
-J
ul
-9
6
3-
Se
p-
96
16
-O
ct
-9
6
28
-N
ov
-9
6
14
-J
an
-9
7
25
-F
eb
-9
7
9-
A
pr
-9
7
22
-M
ay
-9
7
4-
Ju
l-9
7
18
-A
ug
-9
7
30
-S
ep
-9
7
13
-N
ov
-9
7
29
-D
ec
-9
7
10
-F
eb
-9
8
24
-M
ar
-9
8
6-
M
ay
-9
8
18
-J
un
-9
8
31
-J
ul
-9
8
15
-S
ep
-9
8
Index of CAD-USD 
exchange rate
Equal weighted 
index of DEM, 
GBP & JPY
 29
Figure 3: Success of Intervention Based on “Direction” Criterion 
 
This figure displays the results of the sign test based on the “direction” criterion 
with the underlying probability parameter of 0.50. Intervention is a success when 
the CAD/USD rate moves in the direction consistent with the intervention event. 
Each column represents the number of successes based on a different window 
length, ranging from 5 to 120 minutes. For all figures 3.1 through 3.6, the 
horizontal line shows the number of successes necessary for rejecting randomness 
at the 95 percent significance level. 
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Figure 4: Success of Intervention Based on “Smoothing” Criterion 
 
This figure displays the results of the sign test based on the “smoothing” criterion 
with the underlying probability parameter of 0.75. Intervention is a success when 
the CAD/USD rate changes direction consistent with intervention or the rate of 
change of the CAD/USD decreases following intervention. Each column 
represents the number of successes based on a different window length, ranging 
from 5 to 120 minutes. For all figures 4.1 through 4.6, the horizontal line shows 
the number of successes necessary for rejecting randomness at the 95 percent 
significance level. 
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Figure 5: Success of Intervention Based on “Volatility” Criterion 
 
This figure displays the results of the sign test based on the “volatility” criterion 
with the underlying probability parameter of 0.50. Intervention is a success when 
volatility decreases from before to after the event. Each column represents the 
number of successes based on a different window length, ranging from ½ to 2 
hours. For all figures 5.1 through 5.6, the horizontal line shows the number of 
successes necessary for rejecting randomness at the 95 percent significance level. 
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Table 1: Bank of Canada Intervention Transactions, Jan 1995 to Sep 1998 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
 
Official Bank of Canada intervention data as well as the classification of intervention transactions carried 
out in accordance with either the mechanistic or the discretionary intervention framework provided by the 
Bank of Canada. 
 Number of 
Intervention 
Transactions: All 
Number of 
Intervention 
Transactions: Sell 
USD 
Number of 
Intervention 
Transactions: Buy 
USD 
    
Full Sample 1,530   
Mechanistic 836 444 392 
Discretionary 694 688 6 
    
Year: 1995 611   
Mechanistic 611 321 290 
Discretionary 0 0 0 
    
Year: 1996 90   
Mechanistic 41 28 13 
Discretionary 49 49 0 
    
Year: 1997 357   
Mechanistic 184 95 89 
Discretionary 173 173 0 
    
Year: 1998 472   
Mechanistic 0 0 0 
Discretionary 472 466 6 
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Table 2:  Intervention and BoC Monetary Policy Changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 
Direction: 
Purchase (P) 
or Sale (S) of 
USD 
Change in 
overnight 
rate target 
Overnight rate 
target after change 
10-Jan-95 S 0.50 6.00 
12-Jan-95 S 0.50 6.50 
17-Jan-95 S 0.50 7.00 
16-Feb-95 S 0.50 8.00 
10-Jul-95 P -0.25 6.75 
28-Aug-95 P -0.25 6.25 
31-Oct-95 P -0.25 6.00 
25-Jan-96 S -0.25 5.50 
18-Apr-96 S -0.25 4.75 
12-Dec-97 S 0.50 4.25 
30-Jan-98 S 0.50 4.75 
27-Aug-98 S 1.00 5.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note: 
 
 No intervention day coincided with a change in US monetary policy. 
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